I found an interesting article on the PAE website about ethics in economics. The lack of any moral considerations (equality, rights, freedom) in standard neoclassical analysis has always been something that bothered me. The author takes a Kuhnsian view of economics as a science, proposing that economic theories are built on foundations and world-views which are value-laden. He highlights the idea of scientific "facts" being inextricably linked to the theories which examine these facts. "Facts" are explored in the framework of a specific theory, not because there are objectively true but because they are deemed important or appropriate by the theoretical framework within which they are examined. Truth" and "value" are not intrinsic qualities, but are labels ascribed by a specific theory or world-view. This type of analysis has been explored in the philosophy of science, but its implications to economic methodology have not been adequately investigated.
There is a lot more to the article, though it is quite dense if you don't have any background in philosophy. I actually think it would be an interesting discussion piece for the group.
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Very interesting post. One of the lines you hear from professors (right now I'm thinking of Christopher Waller) is that economists should not make value judgments- they should act more like computers. I suppose this has become ingrained in the culture of economists, as so many statements are prefaced with morally neutral qualifying statements. Perhaps this is what earned neo-classical economics the tag of "autistic" in the PAE formulation.
I totally agree. The neoclassical idea is that things such as value judgments,emotions, etc. all distort rational reasoning Though this may be true, it is irrational to believe that all people will act without any moral considerations. Quite ironic, I think.
So, I've been slacking on checking this blog lately, but I want to add something Ruccio talked about in class last week that I agreed with.
His opinion was that it's NOT possible to make policy recommendations on issues such as how to value goods/services and how to distribute the wealth produced by society W/OUT some type of value judgments. In other words, decisions on such issues, no matter how we try to avoid them, require value judgments.
I think this is part of what you guys are getting at, but I wanted to highlight the difference between professors like Waller and Ruccio on this subject.
sean, thanks for the article! i'm reading it this weekend cause not only is it about fact/value distinctions, something i'm really interested in.. it's by a professor I had this year. Charles Wilber, who is really awesome. (and also very willing to discuss with students).
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